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Chinese Celebrities’ Political Signaling on Weibo 1
Dan Chen2 and Gengsong Gao3
Abstract:
In China, celebrities can dominate public discourse and shape popular culture, but they are under
the state’s close gaze. Recent studies have revealed how the state disciplines and co-opts
celebrities to promote patriotism, foster traditional values, and spread political propaganda.
However, how do celebrities adapt to the changing political environment? Focusing on political
signaling on Weibo, we analyze a novel dataset and find that the vast majority of top celebrities
repost from official accounts of government agencies and state media outlets, though there are
variations. Younger celebrities with more followers tend to repost from official accounts more.
Celebrities from Taiwan tend to repost less than those from the mainland and Hong Kong,
despite being subject to the same rules. However, the frequent political signaling by the most
influential celebrities among younger generations suggests that the state has co-opted celebrity
influence on social media to broadly promote its political objectives.
Keywords: celebrity, political signaling, social media, political control, China
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The 11th National Congress of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles
(zhongguo wenlian dishiyici quanguo daibiao dahui 中国文联第十一次全国代表大会) and the
10th National Congress of Chinese Writers Association (zhongguo zuoxie dishici quanguo
daibiao dahui 中国作协第十次全国代表大会) opened at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing
on 14 December 2021.4 Renowned writers, actors, musicians, dancers, television hosts, and other
performing artists were invited to attend the meeting, listen to President Xi Jinping’s speech, and
share their aspirations for aligning their work with public interests and the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP)5 expectations.
The CCP’s use of entertainment celebrities to serve its political agenda has a long history.
During the 1930s, the CCP made concerted efforts to transform the commercialized movie
industry and cultivate leftist script writers, directors, producers, and actors in creating “antifeudal” and “anti-imperialist” revolutionary works of art. The top movie stars, such as Ruan
Lingyu 阮玲玉 and Hu Die 胡蝶, began to appear in various progressive and left-leaning
movies.6 After taking over political power in 1949, the CCP continued to criticize the
commercialized celebrity culture for its association with “corrupted lifestyles, loftiness,
individualism, and liberalism” while transforming movie stars into “movie workers” to propagate
socialist values and promote state policies.7 Meanwhile, the CCP was committed to elevating
ordinary workers, peasants, soldiers, and low-level cadres (e.g., Shi Chuanxiang 时传祥, Dong
Cunrui 董存瑞, Lei Feng 雷锋, Jiao Yulu 焦裕禄) as socialist role models for mass emulation. 8

4

Xinhua News Agency 2021.
The CCP, the Party, the government, and the state are used interchangeably in this article.
6
Pang 2002.
7
Lin and Zhao 2020; He and Wang 2021.
8
Lin and Zhao 2020.
5

1

In the post-Mao era, market-oriented reforms led to a reemergence of commercialized
celebrity culture, a sharp departure from the socialist role models. On the demand side, marketoriented reforms brought about economic prosperity, urbanization, and a growing middle class
eager to consume celebrity-centered fashion, films, music, TV dramas, and entertainment news.
On the supply side, partial commercialization 9 incentivized the media to produce and promote
celebrities to meet audience desires and generate profits, which helped address financial
difficulties caused by reduced state subsidies. Moreover, the market opening attracted a massive
inflow of celebrities from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the West. 10 With the growing celebrity
influence, the CCP sees emerging pernicious celebrity behaviors, such as excessive
individualism, extravagance, sex scandals, and tax evasions. To correct these behaviors and
leverage celebrity influence for its political agenda, the CCP has taken active measures to
regulate and co-opt celebrities. Since 2005, various government agencies have issued regulations
and notices to ban celebrities embroiled in scandals and require them to set moral and patriotic
examples.11
Existing studies on Chinese celebrities focus on how the state uses various political and
legal measures to govern and co-opt celebrities.12 They echo the emphasis on the increasingly
authoritarian nature of the Xi leadership observed in recent scholarship on Chinese politics.
However, from the celebrities’ perspective, how they respond to the growing political control
and what factors shape their responses remain underexplored. Unlike the performing artists in the
Maoist era who followed very similar career paths by working within the state-owned studios,
troupes, and theatres, entertainment celebrities in today’s China come from diverse backgrounds
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and vary significantly in influence, age, place of origin, and route to stardom. The existing
scholarship has examined different types of celebrities (e.g., military, Internet, entrepreneur, and
literary celebrities) 13 and their philanthropic engagements.14 However, we have yet to explore
celebrities’ political significance as a group phenomenon while considering the differences
within. Furthermore, Chinese celebrities’ social and cultural influence has been growing.15 In
2020, China became the largest market in the global movie industry, surpassing the box office of
the United States.16 Therefore, it is important to understand Chinese celebrities’ political
orientation and behavior.
In this study, we examine a specific celebrity behavior that emerged since Xi’s second
term—signaling political loyalty on social media—to understand how celebrities adapt
differently to the state expectations for them to be patriotic and moral exemplars. We built a
novel dataset consisting of the top 218 Chinese celebrities’ demographic and professional
characteristics and their reposts of official messages on Sina Weibo between June and November
2021. We used linear regression models to examine the correlation between individual
characteristics and the tendency to repost official messages. We find that most celebrities (85.3
per cent) reposted official messages from government and state media accounts on Weibo to
signal political loyalty between June and November 2021, but some celebrities did not repost
anything. To explain the variation, we examine three individual-level factors: celebrities’
influence, age, and place of origin. We find that among the celebrities who reposted official
messages, those who have more Weibo followers, who are younger, and who are from the
mainland and Hong Kong reposted more than those who have fewer Weibo followers, who are
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older, and who are from Taiwan. The findings suggest that celebrities adapt to state demands
differently despite operating in the same political environment. However, the frequent political
signaling by the most influential celebrities, primarily those popular with younger generations,
suggests that the state has co-opted celebrity influence on social media to broadly promote its
political objectives. Some celebrities have become willing political actors to promote official
messages, policies, and values. Stardom, social media, and political control operate to produce
mutually beneficial relationships that support the fame and wealth of the celebrity and the
political control of the CCP. The rise of the celebrity industry thus amplifies the CCP’s grip on
social mores and its ability to extract expressions of political support.
Our research has implications for studying China’s evolving authoritarian rule and
celebrity politics in general. In the digital age, celebrities and social media wield tremendous
influence in the public discourse. Capturing celebrity influence on Weibo not only tames a
potential source of competition for the state but also amplifies state messages and promotes the
brand value of official accounts. Official messages reposted by celebrities may be more
persuasive than posts coming from official accounts because celebrities are liked and followed
by millions of fans. In this way, politics is celebritized as celebrities become more involved in
politics and exert more political influence. 17 Furthermore, co-opting celebrity influence on social
media has been an effective strategy for the state to remain relevant in the digital sphere of
information overload. The increasing blend of popular culture and politics thus manifests
China’s evolving authoritarian rule.
Our research also has implications for the study of celebrity politics in general. With
most studies on celebrity politics focused on democracies, scholars have debated the implications
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of celebrities’ political participation. Some contend that celebrities undermine democracy by
trivializing politics and shifting public attention from policies and structural problems to
personalities, images, and rhetorical spins.18 Others argue that celebrities enhance democracy
because they are less complicit with politically vested interests and more likely to break the hold
of established elites on political agendas to mobilize otherwise indifferent citizens. 19 Offering a
study of celebrity politics from an authoritarian political system, our research shows that Chinese
celebrities operate under the state’s close gaze and have become powerful disseminators of state
messages. Therefore, Chinese celebrities are reliable defenders of the Chinese government rather
than agents to propel China’s democratic transition.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. To provide a context for the new
phenomenon of celebrities’ political signaling on Weibo, this article first outlines the growing
celebrity influence in the reform era and the subsequent government crackdown and co-optation.
Then, it explains why celebrities are incentivized to signal political loyalty in light of tightening
political control and why the social media site Weibo has become a dominant space for
celebrities to construct their public image. After setting up the context, this article explores
individual-level factors that correlate with celebrities’ political signaling behavior. It then
discusses the data and the statistical results. The article concludes with a summary of the findings
and the implications.

The Rise of Chinese Celebrities
A celebrity can be defined as “a person whose name, image, lifestyle, and opinions carry
cultural and economic worth, and who are first and foremost idealised popular media

18
19

Van Zoonen 2006.
Cowen 2000; West and Orman 2003.

5

constructions.”20 In China, the performing artists’ participation in commercial activities at the
beginning of the reform era marked the (re)emergence of the celebrity industry. In the 1980s,
market-oriented reforms cut down state subsidies for state-owned movie studios, theatres, and
troupes,21 which led many artists to engage in commercial performances for profit. In 1988,
actors Pan Hong 潘虹 and Li Moran 李默然, who were among the first to use their celebrity
status for commercial gains, appeared in TV advertisements for cosmetics and medicines. 22
Meanwhile, many artists left state-owned cultural institutions to join the private sector, while an
inflow of overseas Chinese singers and actors, mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, pursued
entertainment careers in mainland China. For example, Hong Kong singer Zhang Mingmin 张明
敏 and Chinese American singer Kris Phillips 费翔 were among the first overseas Chinese artists
to appear in the widely watched China Central Television (CCTV) Spring Festival Gala in 1984
and 1987 and became household names overnight.23
The reforms gained momentum after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, leading to
increased prosperity and leisure activities, transnational cultural flows, and the development of
market-driven mass media.24 The cultural and entertainment industry emerged in this context and
experienced rapid growth: more private studios and entertainment companies were established; a
professional agent system gradually formed; more artists left state-owned studios while a
growing number of self-taught artists emerged; more overseas Chinese artists entered the
mainland entertainment market. Among the most popular idols in the 1990s were the Four
Heavenly Kings (sida tianwang 四大天王: Jacky Cheung Hok Yau 张学友, Andy Lau Tak Wah
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刘德华, Leon Lai Ming 黎明, Aaron Kwok Fu Shing 郭富城) from Hong Kong. In the 21st
century, however, the growth of the Internet and the mainland entertainment industry produced a
great number of grassroots celebrities (e.g., Furong Jiejie 芙蓉姐姐), reality show celebrities
(e.g., Li Yuchun 李宇春), and Internet celebrities 网红. Furthermore, the increasing
commercialization of the industry has produced a competitive hierarchical structure where
celebrities have different levels of visibility and business value. The composition of Chinese
celebrities has become more diverse than ever. Meanwhile, problematic behaviors emerged with
the booming celebrity culture and nouveau riche entertainers—tax evasions, sex scandals,
conspicuous consumption, and politically incorrect opinions, which invited the state’s regulatory
attention.

Governance of Celebrities
Since the start of the celebrity culture in the reform era, the CCP has taken measures to
limit or ban what it perceives as “problematic” entertainers and cultural products. For instance,
Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木, a member of the Politburo in the 1980s, criticized movie star Liu
Xiaoqing’s 刘晓庆 memoir My Road as sheer glorification of capitalistic “personal struggle” that
disregards Party principles. 25 Despite her enormous popularity among Chinese urban youth,
Teresa Teng’s 邓丽君 songs were denounced by the government as a “decadent sound” that
conveyed poisonous “bourgeois values” during the anti-spiritual-pollution campaign in the early
1980s.26 However, while Teresa Teng’s songs and Liu Xiaoqing’s movies and TV dramas were
officially banned, they remained accessible. In general, the CCP did not take systematic and
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harsh measures against the “problematic” celebrities during the first two decades of the reform
era.
Entering the 21st century, the CCP tightened its control of celebrities. Since 2005, an
explicit and elaborate policy and legal framework has taken shape to regulate and control
celebrities, their cultural products, media platforms, fan groups, and professional associations.27
For example, banning celebrities (fengsha 封杀) is an extra-legal means to remove celebrities
from the public view, such as removing related films and songs and terminating commercial
contracts and public appearances, as a punishment for celebrities’ breach of legal, ethical, or
political obligations. Such ban notices are typically distributed internally from the top-down by
one or more central government agencies such as the National Radio and Television
Administration (NRTA), the Ministry of Culture, and the Cyberspace Administration of China
under the guidance of the Central Publicity Department of the CCP. 28
In 2014, the former body of NRTA—State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio,
Film, and Television—issued the Notice on Strengthening the Management of the Production
and Dissemination of Related Radio and TV Programs, Film and TV Dramas, and Network
Audiovisual Programs (guanyu jiaqiang youguan guangbo dianshi jiemu, yingshiju he wangluo
shiting jiemu zhizuo chuanbo guanli de tongzhi 关于加强有关广播电视节目, 影视剧和网络
视听节目制作传播管理的通知) to require all broadcasting platforms to block “tainted artists”
(lieji yiren 劣迹艺人) and their entertainment products. According to the Notice, “tainted artists”
are those in the entertainment industry who engage in drug use, prostitution, or other illegal
behaviors. Because celebrities are public figures, these illegal behaviors can generate a harmful
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social impact and mislead young people. Since then, the phrase “tainted artists” has entered the
public discourse, where ordinary citizens have started to use the phrase to judge and criticize
celebrities. This public participation adds further disciplinary power to the state regulations of
celebrity behavior. In addition to drug use and prostitution, other problematic behaviors of a
“tainted artist” include tax evasion, political incorrectness (such as supporting Hong Kong or
Taiwan independence), involvement in official corruption cases, extramarital affairs, and
promoting religion.29
More importantly, the term “good-quality artists” (youzhi yiren 优质艺人) became a
topic of wide discussion, making merely refraining from bad behavior appear inadequate. For
example, in August 2021, the CCTV website published an opinion piece arguing that “it is time
to get serious” about making public figures shoulder social responsibilities and become role
models.30 It revisits the notion of “professional excellence and moral integrity” (deyi shuangxin
德艺双馨), a lofty ideal promoted by the CCP for socialist artists and cultural workers, and
argues that this notion should not be a lofty goal anymore but a professional standard pursued by
every artist.31 In addition, the state has actively promoted “good-quality artists” such as the boy
band TFBoys, who have been featured in the CCTV Spring Festival Gala and promoted by the
Communist Youth League’s official Weibo account. The United Nations in China even awarded
band member Wang Yuan 王源 for his proposal on education reform. 32 Under the state’s
demand for “good-quality artists,” celebrities are incentivized to publicly signal that they are
trying to be the role models expected by the state.
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Celebrities’ Political Signaling
In the existing research on Chinese politics, the concept of signaling has been used to
refer to the state’s signaling toward different audiences, including the signaling of coercive
power toward its citizens33 and the signaling of political intentions toward foreign governments
during international crises.34 In addition, local officials may signal their political loyalty and
competence to political superiors for career advancement. 35 Given the historical and political
context of celebrity politics in China, we define political signaling as celebrity behaviors that
publicly express support and loyalty toward the state and its policies.
Celebrities signal their political loyalty toward the state to create a more conducive
environment for their professional and commercial gains. Indeed, unlike their Western
counterparts who are incentivized to satisfy the market, Chinese celebrities have fostered “a
neoliberal subjectivity with Chinese characteristics,”36 where pleasing the state has become an
effective way to reach the market. Those endorsed by the state are offered rare opportunities to
perform on state television, star in state-sponsored films and TV dramas, serve ambassadorial
roles for government agencies, and attend important national conferences. Participation in these
widely watched activities and artistic works can boost celebrities’ visibility and increase their
commercial value in the competitive show business. Therefore, celebrities have strong incentives
to satisfy state demands in pursuit of career, fame, and wealth. Meanwhile, it is important to
acknowledge that some celebrities may sincerely support the government and genuinely desire to
promote its policies.
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Given the compelling reasons for celebrities to signal political loyalty, what are the
specific ways for them to do so? Celebrities can engage in political signaling in and outside their
professional work. In their professional work, celebrities can play characters in patriotic films
and TV dramas, sing songs for official events such as the 2022 Winter Olympics, and perform at
anniversary celebrations of the founding of the CCP, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Outside their professional work, celebrities can promote
public interest initiatives, post patriotic messages on social media, and serve on official bodies
such as the People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference at both
national and regional levels.
Among these various forms of political signaling, we focus on promoting official
messages on Weibo. This political signaling behavior is selected based on two methodological
considerations. First, all celebrities should be able to engage in political signaling on Weibo if
they so choose, regardless of their status or occupation. In contrast, if a celebrity is not wellknown or qualified enough to star in patriotic films, that celebrity would not have an opportunity
to signal political loyalty that way. However, every celebrity can register a Weibo account and
repost official messages, thus providing an ideal way to compare celebrities’ signaling behavior.
Second, reposting on Weibo is a measurable behavior, allowing a quantitative study of this topic.
Moreover, making high-pitched political statements can be risky, so celebrities are more inclined
to amplify political messages from official sources than to create original content. 37
Understanding the varying frequencies of celebrities’ reposts of official messages will shed light
on how they adapt to the current political and regulatory environment.
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Weibo as a Site of Political Signaling
Why do Chinese celebrities use Weibo as their social media platform to engage the public
and signal political loyalty? Weibo is a microblogging platform launched by Sina Corporation in
August 2009. As of June 2021, it has 566 million monthly active users. 38 During the first decade
of its existence, Weibo has become a digital platform with substantial commercial, cultural,
social, and political influence. Celebrities’ political signaling on Weibo, therefore, constitutes a
very public act that not only displays their political loyalty to the state but also shapes the public
discourse due to their large numbers of followers and extensive networks.
Weibo has become such an important site of public discourse that the government has
developed a palpable presence there. 39 Many government agencies and state media outlets have
set up their official accounts on Weibo. Weibo not only provides a more affordable venue to
publicize official messages, but it is more accessible to ordinary citizens. Furthermore, the
effects of state propaganda, defined as inaccurate, exaggerated, or fabricated information or
rhetoric that favors the regime or disfavors its antagonists,40 can be more easily measured and
assessed using the numbers of views, likes, comments, and reposts.41
Besides government agencies and state media outlets, celebrities have the most visible
influence on Weibo, as shown by the large numbers of followers and user interactions. Since
Weibo was launched in 2009, celebrities have shown a strong preference for Weibo, as opposed
to other social media platforms, when making important announcements, promoting their work,
and conducting commercial activities. For example, when actor Wen Zhang 文章 was found to
have an extramarital affair in March 2014, he publicly apologized to his wife, actress Ma Yili 马
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伊琍, on Weibo, where Ma Yili’s response was also posted. Five years later, when Wen Zhang
and Ma Yili divorced in July 2019, their announcements were again first made available on their
Weibo accounts. These sensational announcements attracted huge media attention and became
widely discussed celebrity gossip.42 In this process, Weibo allowed celebrities to have full
control over the messages they share while benefiting from the massive public attention. In
addition to personal announcements, Weibo has become an important venue to promote
celebrities’ work, including films, TV dramas, and music. It has also become an effective way to
disseminate advertisements to large numbers of followers.
When celebrities repost official messages, we consider it a behavior that reflects
celebrities’ different political sensibilities. While the government has fostered the notion of
“good-quality artists” who can exemplify patriotic and traditional values, there is no evidence to
indicate that the government specifically requires celebrities to repost official messages on
Weibo. For instance, television host Meng Fei 孟非 and singer Na Ying 那英 did not repost any
official messages from June to November 2021, but they were not penalized. Meng Fei even
received a prestigious award for television host—Golden Voice—from the NRTA in 2022.
Therefore, celebrities’ political signaling on Weibo reflects their different adaptations to state
demands.
Weibo has become an important site of public discourse where the presence of
government agencies, state media outlets, and celebrities powerfully shape public attention and
discourse. It has also become a site of public discussion and information diffusion. 43 Celebrities’
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political signaling on Weibo thus carries unique significance in our understanding of celebrity
politics in China. So how does this signaling behavior vary among Chinese celebrities?

Celebrity Characteristics and Political Signaling
Celebrity Influence
Existing research on American celebrities suggests that more star power correlates with a
larger amount of advocacy work for social welfare and other political causes, as celebrities tend
to benefit from a positive public image while interest groups tend to reach out to influential
celebrities.44 In the Chinese context, existing research finds that influential celebrities’
philanthropic engagements can mobilize their fans and generate virtual participatory
communities and offline volunteering communities. 45 Based on the pattern that influential
celebrities tend to engage in social and political advocacy, we expect a positive correlation
between the level of celebrity influence and the level of political signaling on Weibo. We have
several specific reasons for this expectation.
First, nationalist sentiments are becoming more visible in the Chinese online discourse. 46
This political context helps to normalize celebrities’ promotion of official messages, which tend
to resonate with the public. Second, celebrities with more influence tend to attract more
disciplinary attention and co-optation attempts from the state, as celebrity influence can be
perceived as “vying for visibility” and potentially dangerous if used to foment political dissent. 47
Therefore, more influential celebrities should have stronger incentives to signal political loyalty
under the tightening legal and regulatory framework. Indeed, celebrities are “more anxious to be
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officially recognized and co-opted by the state and join the competitive ‘mainstream’
entertainment circle” to survive in the precarious entertainment industry.48 Third, celebrities may
benefit from earning opportunities to appear in state-sponsored events, which would increase
their commercial value. Therefore, celebrities are positively and negatively motivated to display
alignment with the government on social media.
Meanwhile, some celebrities may signal political loyalty first and are rewarded with
valuable professional opportunities, allowing them to gain more public influence. For instance,
TFBoys started to reach beyond the music industry and bring film offers in recent years. One of
its members starred in the nationalist war film The Battle at Lake Changjin (changjin hu 长津湖)
in 2021, the highest-grossing Chinese film of all time,49 suggesting that celebrities who
propagate the government’s “positive values” are rewarded professionally and financially.
Regardless of the causal direction, we should observe a correlation between celebrity
influence on Weibo and the frequency of their political signaling. We measure celebrity
influence on Weibo by (1) the number of followers and (2) the number of user engagements,
including likes, comments, and reposts. Celebrities display their alignment with the Party by
reposting messages from official accounts. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Celebrities’ number of Weibo followers positively correlates with their number of
reposts from official accounts.

Hypothesis 2: Celebrities’ number of Weibo engagements positively correlates with the number
of reposts from official accounts.
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Celebrity Age
Reposting official messages on Weibo is a unique type of political signaling. Unlike
playing war heroes in patriotic films or singing songs promoting government projects, reposting
on Weibo is outside celebrities’ professional work. It is tailored to a specific realm of online
public discourse dominated by Weibo users who are primarily young (born after 1990), urban
(concentrating in the following five urban clusters: Beijing-Tianjin-Heibei, Yangtze Delta,
Fujian Triangle, Pearl River Delta, and Sichuan and Chongqing), entertainment-minded, and star
chasers (zhuixing zu 追星族).50 Therefore, contrary to the impression that celebrities stand out
from the ordinary people for their bold individualism and independent spirit,51 younger
celebrities in China may find Weibo a fitting space to signal political loyalty. This is due to
several factors.
First, younger celebrities are savvier about Weibo, which only came into existence in
2009 and became popular in the 2010s. Younger celebrities are digital natives and more
confident about effectively using Weibo to their advantage. Although celebrities tend to have
public relations teams who manage their online images and social media accounts, they still have
control over their Weibo posting. Our interviews with two cultural content producers in China,
who have many Weibo followers and are familiar with celebrities’ Weibo operations, suggest
that both celebrities and their agents may participate in drafting Weibo posts. However,
ultimately the posts need to be approved by the celebrities. Therefore, celebrities’ Weibo posts
should reflect their own opinions and attitudes.
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Second, Weibo is populated by younger generations. According to the 2020 Weibo User
Development Report published by Sina Corporation, in 2020, users born after 1990 made up
close to 80% of all Weibo users. 52 In the entertainment industry, the fan base of older celebrities
tends to be older, while the fan base of younger celebrities tends to be younger. Therefore,
younger celebrities may find Weibo a more fitting space to engage their fans, conduct
commercial activities, and signal political loyalty.
Third, pro-government and nationalist online discourses from Chinese youth–younger
celebrities’ fan base–have become commonplace, providing a conducive environment for
younger celebrities to connect with their fans and signal political loyalty. A recent study finds
that official digital revamping of the state media, expansion of government Weibo, and official
promotion of patriotic bloggers have encouraged netizen participation, including reposting,
sharing, and creating content to promote official messages.53 In this environment, the
phenomenon of “little pinks” (xiao fenhong 小粉红) emerged in 2016, illustrating younger
generations’ nationalist expression in cyberspace. 54 In a recent study of quotidian expressions of
nationalism during the Covid-19 pandemic, the author finds that Chinese netizens on Zhihu 知
乎, a Q&A platform whose users are primarily educated young urbanites, exhibit a confident and
rational but confrontational and xenophobic posture in their quotidian discourses.55 Furthermore,
a recent study of Chinese public opinion finds that the Xi generation, those who came of age in
the past decade, is more oriented toward authoritarianism than its preceding generations,
suggesting genuine political support among Chinese youth.56 Not only are younger celebrities
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part of the Chinese youth, but their fans also belong to this group. Therefore, we expect younger
celebrities to engage Weibo for political signaling more than older celebrities.

Hypothesis 3: Younger celebrities tend to repost more from official accounts than older
celebrities.

Celebrities’ Place of Origin
At the beginning of the reform era, popular culture from Hong Kong and Taiwan swept
the mainland, so much so that the term Gangtai Liuxing Wenhua 港台流行文化 was coined to
refer to this phenomenon.57 Though the influence of Gangtai Liuxing Wenhua has waned in
recent decades as the mainland cultural industry rapidly grows, a substantial number of
celebrities from Hong Kong and Taiwan continue to operate on the mainland.
Celebrities from Hong Kong and Taiwan are subject to the same rules and regulations
when they work on the mainland.58 Indeed, there have been cases where celebrities from Hong
Kong and Taiwan were censured due to their political incorrectness. For example, Chou Tze-yu
周子瑜 and A-mei 张惠妹, Taiwan singers, were compelled by their industry employers to
apologize for singing the anthem of the Republic of China and waving its flag. 59 Denise Ho 何韵
诗, a Hong Kong singer and actress, was arrested in December 2021 by the national security
police for supporting Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement.60
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Despite being subject to the same regulatory framework, we expect celebrities’ political
signaling on Weibo to differ depending on their place of origin. First, Hong Kong celebrities
may depend more on the mainland market than Taiwan celebrities, as Hong Kong’s local market
(7 million people) is much smaller than Taiwan’s (23 million people). Therefore, we should
expect a stronger incentive for Hong Kong celebrities to signal loyalty to the Chinese
government than Taiwan celebrities.
Second, celebrities from Taiwan are arguably in a different position than celebrities from
Hong Kong and the mainland. Hong Kong and the mainland are under the control of the Chinese
government. Hong Kong’s autonomy has given way to central control, especially after the
protests in 2019 and the subsequent imposition of the National Security Law in 2020. In contrast,
Taiwan remains a self-ruled island with its own political and legal system. If a Taiwan celebrity
violates rules set by the Chinese government, commercial interests may propel that celebrity to
apologize and rectify his or her behavior. However, legal punishment is rare unless the celebrity
is physically on the mainland when the violation occurs.
Third, in Taiwan, though most citizens favor maintaining the status quo regarding the
relationship with the mainland, more citizens favor independence than those who prefer
reunification in recent years.61 Thus, many citizens dislike Taiwan celebrities aligning with the
Chinese government and becoming its propaganda instruments. For example, Taiwan celebrities
who participated in the CCP’s centennial and the PRC’s National Day celebrations in 2021 or
expressed pro-China and pro-reunification views, such as Ouyang Nana 欧阳娜娜 and Angela
Chang 张韶涵, were harshly criticized and ridiculed by Taiwan officials, media, and citizens for
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fawning on China to make money. 62 Therefore, the politics within Taiwan may also propel
Taiwan celebrities to refrain from openly displaying alignment with the Chinese government.
Though some Taiwan celebrities may feel the need to signal political loyalty to the
Chinese government in order to continue their careers on the mainland, on the whole, their need
should be weaker than celebrities from Hong Kong and the mainland. This discussion leads to
the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Celebrities from Taiwan tend to repost from official accounts less than celebrities
from Hong Kong and the mainland.

Data and Results
We analyzed more than 16,300 Weibo posts published between June and November 2021
by top 218 Chinese celebrities. These celebrities are selected based on two criteria. First, they are
named on the Forbes China Celebrity List between 2004 and 2020. Forbes China Celebrity List,
first launched in 2004, is an annual list (except in 2016 and 2018) that ranks celebrities based on
their influence, measured by income and exposure in the media. 63 Starting in 2010, the List
includes celebrities born in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other countries and regions besides the
mainland.64 It is a comprehensive list that includes actors, singers, presenters, directors, writers,
models, athletes, and other celebrities. Second, we used the number of Weibo followers to
discern the most influential celebrities in 2021. Given the landscape of celebrities on Weibo, we
chose ten million followers as a cutoff point for selecting celebrities with broad influence in
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society. In the Chinese celebrity industry, purchasing fake followers and using bots to generate
engagements on social media are common, but faking ten million followers is too costly and
algorithmically difficult. While some celebrities with more than ten million followers may have
purchased bots-driven followers to enhance their reputation and commercial value, their
visibility and influence are indisputable.
After collecting the Weibo posts, we conducted content analysis to code reposts from
official accounts between June and November 2021. We used the following criteria for coding:
(1) the post should be a repost from another account, and (2) the original account in the repost
should be an official account. The official accounts used in our content analysis include People’s
Daily and its website, CCTV News and other CCTV channels, Xinhua News Agency and its
website, Xinhua Finance, China News, Global Times, Liberation Daily, China Daily, China
Youth Daily, China News Weekly, Guangming Daily, Central Military Theater, Foreign Affairs
Spokesperson Office, CGTV Journalists, Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, China Fire, People’s
Navy, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and the Communist Youth
League.
The six-month period from June to November 2021 witnessed several high-profile
political events and anniversaries, such as the CCP’s centennial, the army day, the national day,
anniversaries of Japan’s invasion and surrender, the Tokyo Olympics, and the launch of the
Shenzhou spacecraft. State media outlets and government agencies actively posted about these
events and anniversaries to tout state achievements, boost nationalist sentiments, and enhance
political legitimacy. Thus, the six-month period provides a conducive opportunity to gauge
celebrities’ differing levels of political signaling. The number of reposts from official accounts is
our dependent variable. It measures the frequency of celebrity signaling toward the government
during the six months.
21

Official accounts, including those of state media outlets and government agencies,
publish approximately 10-40 posts every day on both political and non-political content. Nonpolitical content comprises weather, traffic, food, and entertainment news. Political content
covers political leaders’ activities, government-led achievements, public policies, and politically
significant anniversaries. In addition, political content covers international news, though much of
this category is negative, such as racist incidents, social unrest, public health crises, and political
protests. Overall, official accounts seek to boost nationalism and political legitimacy by
portraying a rosy picture of China and a gloomy picture of Western democratic countries. When
celebrities repost from official accounts, the messages are strategically selected. Politically
important messages, such as the CCP’s centennial, the national day, and Chinese athletes
winning Olympic medals, are commonly reposted. In addition, celebrities may repost messages
to advance the public interest, such as reposting ways to help relieve natural disasters. The
negative news about Western democratic countries is typically not reposted. Figure 1 shows
examples of celebrity reposts.
While Chinese athletes winning Olympic medals is an outcome of a sports event, it has
significant political meaning. First, sports and politics are intimately imbricated with each other.
The Chinese government invests heavily in training Olympic athletes. It is estimated that the
government invested about 15.7 million yuan (US$ 2.34 million) for each gold medal at the 2008
Beijing Olympics.65 Indeed, government spending on sports is a determining factor for China’s
Olympic success.66 In turn, the government harnesses Chinese athletes’ achievements to boost
regime support.67 Second, the political signaling is conspicuous when celebrities repost official
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messages about Chinese athletes winning Olympic medals rather than posting a “non-official,”
self-drafted message to congratulate the athletes.
Among the 218 celebrities in our dataset, 85.3 per cent reposted from official accounts at
least once between June and November 2021, while 14.7 per cent did not repost anything during
the same period. Among those who reposted, the frequency of reposts varies from 1 to 33 during
the six months. Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of the reposts.

Figure 1. Examples of Celebrity Reposts

Source: Weibo.

23

60
40
0

20

Frequency

80

100

Figure 2. Frequency of Celebrity Reposts

0

5

10

15

20

25

Number of Reposts from Official Accounts
Source: Authors’ dataset.

24

30

35

We use linear regression models to test the hypotheses to understand the variation in the
frequency of celebrity reposts. Our goal is to examine the correlation between variables rather
than to discern causation, as we are interested in understanding which celebrities tend to repost
from official accounts more (or less). Our independent variables include a celebrity’s number of
followers on Weibo, the average number of Weibo engagements (including likes, comments, and
reposts), age, and place of origin. In addition, we include gender, generation, and education as
control variables, the data for which come from publicly available sources. Summary statistics
are presented in Table 1 for numeric variables and Figure 3 for categorical variables.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Numeric Variables
Variable
Mean
Median
Reposts from official accounts
8.22
7.00
Number of followers (in 1,000,000) 32.90
24.72
Number of engagements (in 1,000)
62.60
13.41
Age
39.15
39.00
Source: Authors’ dataset.
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Min.
0
10.08
0.22
20.00

Max.
33.00
130.00
1049.09
67.00

Std. dev.
6.97
23.06
139.83
8.93

Figure 3. Summary Statistics for Categorical Variables
Generation
150
95
(43.58%)

156
(71.56%)

50

100

Frequency

100

81
(37.16%)

50

Frequency

150

Place of Origin

42
(19.27%)

0

0
Born before 1980

Born between
1980 and 1990

Mainland

Born after 1990

Gender

Taiwan

97
(44.50%)

125
(57.34%)
93
(42.66%)

0

0

50

100

121
(55.50%)

Frequency

150

150
100

Hong Kong

Education

50

Frequency

37
(16.97%)

26
(11.48%)

Female

Male

No College Degree

Source: Authors’ dataset.
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College Degree

To test our hypotheses, we first examine bivariate associations using linear regression
models, summarized in Figure 4. The results support our hypotheses. At a statistically significant
level, Model (1) shows that every million additional followers are associated with 0.08 more
reposts from official accounts between June and November of 2021; Model (2) shows that every
thousand additional engagements on Weibo are associated with 0.01 more reposts from official
accounts during the same period; Model (3) shows that each year a celebrity is younger is
associated with 0.38 more reposts from official accounts during the same period; Model (4)
shows that there is a statistically significant difference not only between Taiwan and mainland
celebrities but also between Hong Kong and mainland celebrities. Compared to mainland
celebrities, on average Taiwan celebrities have 7.83 fewer reposts from official accounts between
June and November of 2021, while Hong Kong celebrities have 3.87 fewer reposts during the
same period.
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Figure 4. Bivariate Associations
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Taiwan

Since all three factors are correlated with the number of reposts from official accounts, it
is important to examine the relative importance of these factors. Table 2 summarizes the results
of multivariate regression models. Results from Model (5) show that, when we account for all
four independent variables in the same model, the number of Weibo engagements and the
difference between mainland and Hong Kong celebrities are not statistically significant anymore.
In contrast, the statistical significance and direction of the other variables remain the same.
Overall, the results still provide support for our hypotheses.
In Model (6), we control for gender, generation, and education to account for the
potential influence of other celebrity characteristics. The results are still consistent with our
hypotheses. Additionally, male celebrities tend to repost less from official accounts than female
celebrities between June and November 2021. While we hesitate to surmise the reasons behind
the gender difference in political signaling, it is plausible to examine the pervasive gender
hierarchy in celebrity culture and the broader Chinese society. 68 The disadvantaged status of
female celebrities may propel them to signal more in order to secure a more favorable position in
the public sphere, especially in the eyes of the state. Indeed, there have been high-profile cases of
the state disciplining celebrities in recent years, including female celebrities such as Fan
Bingbing 范冰冰 (2018), Zheng Shuang 郑爽 (2021), and Wei Ya 薇娅(2021), all of whom
were charged with tax fraud and evasion.
As a robustness check, we use an alternative measure of the dependent variable—the
number of reposts from official accounts between January and May 2021—to run the same
regression models. Compared to June to November 2021, the first five months of the year are
relatively quiet regarding political events and anniversaries, which allows us to test whether the
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pattern of celebrities’ political signaling behavior is consistent when political events are less
dominating. Because some celebrities used the Weibo setting of “only showing posts from the
past six months,” we could not collect these celebrities’ posts from January to May 2021. As a
result, our sample size dropped to 147, meaning that about 33 per cent of the 218 celebrities
chose to limit the visibility of old Weibo posts. This decision could be a deliberate strategy for
celebrities to preempt potential political or professional backlash from past Weibo posts. 69 Using
this alternative measure, we report regression results in Table 2, which show a pattern similar to
our previous findings. Model (7) shows that more followers, younger age, and originating from
the mainland and Hong Kong are correlated with more reposts from official accounts. Adding in
the control variables, Model (8) shows similar results, consistent with the models from June to
November 2021.

69
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30

Table 2. Regression Results
Number of reposts from
official accounts
(June-November 2021)

Number of reposts from
official accounts
(January-May 2021)

Model (5)

Model (6)

Model (7)

Model (8)

Number of followers (in
1,000,000)

0.05**
(0.02)

0.05**
(0.02)

0.04**
(0.01)

0.04**
(0.01)

Number of engagements (in
1,000)

0.002
(0.003)

0.004
(0.003)

0.002
(0.002)

0.002
(0.003)

Age

-0.31***
(0.05)

-0.39***
(0.09)

-0.16***
(0.03)

-0.14*
(0.06)

Place of origin (=Hong
Kong)

-0.85
(1.25)

-1.01
(1.30)

-0.70
(0.72)

-0.76
(0.75)

Place of origin (=Taiwan)

-6.15***
(1.03)

-6.45***
(1.05)

-2.70***
(0.60)

-2.74***
(0.62)

Gender (=male)

-2.00**
(0.77)

-0.71
(0.49)

Generation (post-80)

-1.41
(1.31)

0.17
(0.85)

Generation (post-90)

-2.14
(2.27)

0.77
(1.47)

College degree (=yes)

0.07
(0.80)

-0.02
(0.50)

Intercept

19.81***
(1.99)

24.97***
(4.64)

8.74***
(1.21)

8.09**
(2.81)

Multiple R-squared

0.39

0.41

0.45

0.46

N

218

218

147

147

Source: Authors’ dataset.
Notes: Entries are estimated coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The reference category for Generation is born before 1980. The reference category for Place of Origin
is mainland. The reference category for Gender is female. The reference category for Education is no college
degree. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Together, the regression results support our hypotheses that celebrities’ influence, age,
and place of origin correlate with political signaling on Weibo. Specifically, younger celebrities
with more followers tend to repost from official accounts more, while celebrities from Taiwan
tend to repost from official accounts less than those from the mainland and Hong Kong. The
findings suggest that celebrities adapt to state demands differently despite operating in the same
political environment. Celebrities who are more influential, younger, and from the mainland and
Hong Kong tend to toe the Party line more closely. However, the overall effect of reposting from
official accounts helps create a favorable discursive and cultural environment to amplify state
messages.

Conclusion
As the celebrity industry rapidly grew in the reform era, the Chinese state’s governance
of celebrities has become more sophisticated. Adapting to the changing political environment,
younger celebrities who have more followers and come from the mainland or Hong Kong tend to
repost more official messages on Weibo as a way to signal their political loyalty to the state and
shape online public discourse. The frequent political signaling by the most influential celebrities
among younger generations in China suggests that the state has co-opted celebrity influence on
social media to broadly promote its political objectives. The convergence of the state’s political
demand, celebrities’ cultural influence, and social media’s broad reach has allowed the state to
dominate online public discourse. Popular culture has become a key instrument of political
legitimation in China.
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摘要：在中国，名人可以主导公共话语并塑造流行文化，但他们处于国家的密切关注之
下。最近的研究揭示了国家如何惩戒和利用名人来促进爱国主义、培养传统价值观和强化
政治宣传。但名人如何适应不断变化的政治环境呢？集中于在微博上发送政治信号这一现
象，我们分析了一个新的数据集，发现绝大多数顶级名人都会转发政府机构和官方媒体的
微博博文，但是这种转发行为也有差异。拥有更多追随者的年轻的名人倾向于更多地从官
方账户转发。尽管受到相同规则的限制，台湾名人的转发率往往低于大陆和香港名人。然
而，年轻一代中最有影响力的名人频繁发出政治信号表明，国家已经利用名人在社交媒体
上的影响力来更广泛地促进其政治目标。
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